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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Gerald M 0hapman*
Search and Seizure on Probable Cause in Automobile CasesAlthough the recent trend of the Supreme Court cases has tended to
narrow the area in which a search may be conducted without a warrant, Brinegarv. U. S., 69 S. Ct. 1302 (1949), occasioned a reaffirmance
of the liberal doctrine in (arroll v. U. S., 267 U. S. 132 (1924), regarding the searching of automobiles. An officer of the Federal Alcohol
Tax Unit had arrested the defendant about five months before the
instant offense for illegally transporting liquor, had seen him loading
liquor into a truck in Joplin, Missouri on at least two occasions and
knew his reputation for illegally hauling liquor into Oklahoma from
Missouri. On the day of the offense this officer was parked in a car about
five miles from the Oklahoma-Missouri line when he observed Brinegar
driving past in his car which appeared to be heavily loaded. After some
chase Brinegar was curbed and when the agents asked how much
liquor he had in the car replied, "Not too much." Further questioning
and search produced twelve cases. The agent then arrested Brinegar
and seized the liquor.
In reviewing the conviction resulting from this arrest, the Supreme
Court held that the privilege against searches and seizures contained
in the Fourth Amendment was not violated since the officer knew that
Brinegar did haul liquor into Oklahoma and had seen him obtaining the
liquor in Joplin. Thus there was a strong showing of the source of
supply, the probable destination and the illegal market in this case
from general knowledge and reasonable grounds for suspicion that the
petitioner was engaged in this business.
Counsel for Brinegar, however, argued that since the evidence of
the officer's previous arrest of the defendant could not be introduced
in evidence at the trial, it could not be introduced at the hearing on
the motion to suppress the evidence. Had this argument prevailed it
would have had the effect of barring a showing of probable cause.
Speaking for the majority of the court, however, Mr. Justice Rutledge
pointed out that there is a difference between a hearing on a motion
to suppress and the actual trial. In the actual trial the issue is guilt
or innocence while at the hearing on the motion it is only probable
cause; thus, he continued, there is a difference in the standards of
evidence admissibility. While guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, probable cause requires merely a showing of probability
or reasonable ground for a belief of guilt. The line which is drawn
is one between probable cause and mere suspicion. Justice Rutledge
also pointed out that there is a difference between the search of a house
with its accompanying invasion of privacy and the search of a swiftly
moving vehicle on a public highway. In the latter case, knowledge on
the part of the officer that a suspect has repeatedly given substantial
ground for believing that he is engaged in using such transportation
illegally is sufficient to support a search. For a general discussion of
the law relating to the search of automobiles see Note (1947) 38 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 190.
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Necessity for Precision in Use of Harger Breath Test- In State v. Hunter, 68 A. (2d) 274 (1949), a conviction for drunken driving was
reversed because of the use of an improper scale in conducting the
Harger Breath Test. The critical factor in the test is the weighing
of the aseerite tube which contains a carbon dioxide absorbent element. Given the amount of carbon dioxide absorbed by this tube,
the concentration of alcohol in the breath can be determined by simple
arithmetic since both the quantity of alcohol and the ratio of carbon
dioxide in the breath are known. The measurements are so small that
an analytical balance, sensitive to a tenth of one milligram, is required for accuracy. In the instant case, however, the physician conducting the test used a pharmacist's scale at a local drug store;
subsequent investigation disclosed that the scale used was a torsion
balance which type. of scale is usually only sensitive down to two
milligrams.
After the case was concluded, the defendant realized the importance of the type of balance used to weigh the ascerite tube. He then
filed a petition for a new trial, the New Jersey procedure to reopen
the case. Normally, a case can only be reopened where there is newly
discovered evidence, material to the issue, whose absence at the
original trial was not due to the negligence of the defendant. In
passing on this question, the New Jersey court specifically ruled that
the defendant could not be charged with knowledge of the procedures
of the Harger test, about which a qualified physican had been confused, and the failure to raise the point at the original trial was not
negligence.
Although this case does not alter the status of the results of the
Harger test in New Jersey, the court specifically stating that such
results were admissible, it does point up the importance of minute
observance of all technical procedures in a scientific test whose results
are to be introduced in evidence. Not only may the test results be
invalidated by the omission, but their invalidation offers a fertile field
for opening up a supposedly closed case. Moreover, it is to be noted,
particularly in connection with the Harger test, that the opportunity
to repeat it no longer exists when the error is discovered. On the admissibility of these test results see Note (1947) 38 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 441. See also Note (1946) 37 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
188 (admissibility of evidence of refusal to submit to tests).

